China is modernizing its militia forces to support the PLA. This report analyzes training reforms, joint ops, and strategic implications.

Executive Summary

Nearly eight years into reform efforts, the ability of China’s militia forces to support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) across all domains is likely improving. Progress is slow and almost certainly uneven across geographies and force types, but the Central Military Commission (CMC) National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD) likely assesses that the quality of militia training is rising. Since approximately 2018, the CMC NDMD has overseen systematic efforts to address challenges across many aspects of militia training — facilities, equipment, participation, realism, jointness, instruction, evaluation, and organization. The focus of militia construction during this period has been to effect a “transformation” from “getting real” (实起来) to “getting strong” (强起来), wherein sub-national authorities responsible for building militia forces were likely instructed to resolve structural and organizational obstacles and increasingly focus on training effective modern forces.

At the CMC NDMD’s direction, authorities have reoriented militia forces to focus on wartime requirements over emergency response functions and issued regulations to strengthen the commitment of militia personnel. They are working to normalize joint training between militias and the PLA and other military and non-military forces, and are likely increasing their focus on training militias to act as cohesive units. At least for authorities with adequate resources, they are investing in militia training bases, adopting simulation technologies, and using data to enhance performance evaluations. Authorities have very likely also restructured militia training to better develop foundational military, specialized, and mission operations skills. Many of these efforts are not new, but expectations for implementation, institutionalization, and outcomes are likely increasing.

Early militia downsizing efforts are likely complete, and pockets of excellence within militia forces are likely emerging. While conventional assessments stress that China’s militias are under-resourced, poorly trained, and ineffective for military (rather than emergency response) operations, the reform efforts begun in 2018 have likely placed these forces on a trajectory that could eventually render such assessments outdated. However, continuing references in Chinese military media and local government documents to the “real”-to-”strong” transformation — which was likely intended for completion in 2020 — indicate the slow pace of militia system reform and lingering organizational problems, and many long-standing challenges to militia development (such as local budget constraints) almost certainly remain relevant for gauging this trajectory.

In response to China’s increasing focus on militia work, governments, militaries, and national security-focused analysts should begin monitoring (or intensify monitoring of) militia construction as part of efforts to understand China’s total armed forces and national defense mobilization capability. Increasing focus on militia development also likely serves as an indicator for assessing China’s intentions with regard to Taiwan, as these forces would very likely be mobilized to support the war effort within China, in the Taiwan Strait, and in cyberspace. These forces are very likely also relevant to China’s preparations for other contingencies, such as conflict in the South China Sea. Key questions to watch going forward include whether authorities introduce a new stage of development under the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP; 2026-2030), whether training time increases, and how frequently and sophisticatedly militia joint training with the PLA occurs (especially at the campaign level).

Key Findings

• Current militia training guidelines likely seek to promote realism, rigor, and training enhancements delivered by technology and certain methodological approaches, such as virtual reality (VR) for immersive drills, “no script” training to enhance independent decision-making, and cross-jurisdiction activities to raise the quality of militia instructors.


• Authorities are innovating methods for organizing militia training, with goals that likely include improving the development of niche skills and “special forces” like cyber militias and increasing year-round readiness levels; however, despite the focus on readiness, it is likely that not all militia forces undergo training each year.


• Authorities are likely making top-down changes to the militia system to improve coordination and jointness between militia forces and the PLA, integrating militia training with the joint operations training system, and establishing an integrated joint evaluation mechanism, likely leading to more regular joint training and use of PLA resources for militia training.


• Particularly since December 2023, successive provincial-level authorities have implemented policies to increase public enthusiasm for militia construction and improve the willingness of militia personnel to participate in training, directly addressing concerns that have historically impaired the quality of China’s militia forces.


• The CMC NDMD is guiding these and other activities — including reforming financial support for militias and merging militia equipment management with the whole-military weapons equipment system — to drive forward militia construction in support of China’s integrated national strategic system and capability, demanding real effort and results

Methodology

China’s militia forces are highly decentralized. Military authorities across dozens of provincial military districts (省军区; PMD) and garrisons at the same level, hundreds of subordinate military sub-districts (军分区; MSD), and thousands of county-level and grassroots-level people’s armed forces departments (人民武装部; PAFD) are tasked with militia development, supported (particularly funded¹) by civilian authorities at the same level.^{2 3} Further, militia forces are categorized into emergency response forces (应急力量), specialized forces (专业力量), and special forces (特殊力量), and organized to fulfill hundreds of roles depending on the anticipated emergency response and wartime requirements of their local area or command.^{4 5} The types of militias organized — and the training required — vary across provinces, cities, counties, and communities. Many available public sources focus on developments and strategies in specific locations, challenging assessments of developments relevant throughout the entire militia system.

Despite this geographic and functional fragmentation, the militia system is ultimately hierarchical. The CMC NDMD Militia Reserve Bureau (中央军事委员会国防动员部民兵预备役局), in particular, works through the PMD system (which consists of the military commands outlined above) to set relevant policies, standards, procedures, and requirements.⁶ Two critical documents in this effort include the “Militia Construction 14th Five-Year Plan” (民兵建设“十四五”规划; MC 14th FYP) (2021-2025) and the “Militia Military Training Outline” (民兵军事训练大纲; MMTO). Although interpretation and implementation at the local level will vary, these documents orient nationwide militia development toward shared goals in a way that almost certainly creates a baseline for assessing trends throughout the system.

This report uses Chinese military media, local government documents, and other publicly discoverable sources to identify the likely contents of the MC 14th FYP and likely objectives of the MMTO in relation to militia training. The core of the analysis is a review of China Militia⁷ articles published between January 2023 and July 2025 that directly reference the CMC NDMD and its activities, which enabled assessment of this military authority’s priorities and activities in recent years. References within these China Militia articles to particular goals, concepts, and training approaches informed subsequent searches of Chinese sources available through the Recorded Future Intelligence Operations Platform and other open-source avenues, enabling an exploration of trends that are likely relevant to understanding the evolution of militia training throughout China. Additionally, this report draws on a leaked copy of an MMTO that was likely issued in the early 2010s to understand the topics this document covers and assess new developments.

There are several limitations to this approach. While this report strives to highlight trends that are likely relevant throughout the militia system, it is not possible to definitively assert that any single goal, concept, or approach is being implemented across all of China. There is more evidence for some approaches than others, but uneven implementation of national-level expectations is a core challenge to the CMC NDMD’s efforts.⁸ It is similarly difficult to make definitive statements about aspects of militia development that are growing more or less common throughout the system; Chinese academic databases are used to support such analysis when possible. Additionally, no media source used for this research is, despite being credible, necessarily authoritative. The government documents used are authoritative but typically only speak for very specific localities. Nevertheless, the available public sources impart a picture of a militia system under pressure to reform training deficiencies since approximately 2018. Several notable trends and objectives that analysts should consider in future evaluations of China’s militia forces are also found.

Finally, this report focuses on authorities’ efforts to improve militia training. It does not address other essential elements of militia development, such as political education and strategies to organize forces. Some relevant topics, such as militias’ access to necessary equipment, are only discussed briefly.

The Goals and Challenges of Militia Construction

Militia forces are a component of China’s armed forces alongside the PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP), whose personnel retain their full-time civilian occupations. Militias are under the dual leadership of civilian and military authorities (though Chinese military organizational reforms may be affecting this arrangement), are part of China’s national defense mobilization system (国防动员体系; NDMS), and are “assistants” (助手) to and a reserve force (后备力量) for the PLA. There are two main categories of militias, “primary” and “ordinary.” Primary militias (基干民兵) receive more training, resources, and are the focus of recruitment efforts, while ordinary militias (普通民兵) are a secondary reserve of registered male citizens. Except where stated otherwise, this report focuses on primary militias.

China’s militia forces have multiple responsibilities that include contributing to socialist modernization, maintaining social order, responding to emergencies like natural disasters, and defending the homeland. Historically, in the context of warfighting, the focus of militia construction was mostly on arming forces for conducting conventional and guerilla operations alongside (and as a supplement to) the PLA under the strategies of “luring the enemy in deep” and traditional People’s War. However, at least since the PLA oriented itself toward “winning local wars under informatized conditions” (打赢信息化条件下的局部战争) in 2004 (and likely to some extent before), the “core function” (核心职能) of militia forces and their “main” (主) orientation has been wartime “assistance and support operations tasks” (支援保障作战任务) rather than “directly participating in war.” Over the last decade, authorities have particularly emphasized building “new-type” or “new-quality” militia forces that can support the PLA across all domains — land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum — in the context of modern warfare.

Authorities from the PMD system and relevant PLA theater commands would very likely mobilize militia personnel for a range of responsibilities in wartime, some of which could be dangerous, occur at or near the front line of the conflict, and directly contribute to the success or failure of the PLA’s mission. Potential tasks include but are not limited to conducting or supporting local and rear area defense, cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, stability maintenance (entailing efforts to control unrest and dissent), joint air defense, support PLA logistics, search and rescue, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, enemy harassment, camouflage and deception, minelaying, blockade enforcement, offensive cyber operations, the deployment of special operations forces at sea, and port landing operations.

Historically, China’s militia forces have carried out these roles. Maritime militia forces played a crucial role in China’s capture of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974. Forces on Woody Island were rapidly mobilized and transported by the PLA Navy to Duncan Island and Palm Island, where they rebuffed Vietnamese navy commandos. Fishing trawlers also provided authorities in China early warning that Vietnam’s navy was moving into the Paracels. During China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979, support provided by militia forces from Yunnan and Guangxi reportedly included recapturing a riverine island seized by Vietnam, repulsing cross-border attacks from Vietnam, providing artillery support to PLA forces, repairing a road to enable PLA armored forces to outflank the enemy, delivering ammunition and supplies to the front, moving wounded personnel to the rear, and serving as guides to PLA forces along the border.

However, various challenges have long impaired militia force construction and training. This is almost certainly due, in part, to the fact that militia work prioritized the needs of economic development rather than those of national defense from 1985 to approximately 2016 or 2018 (see the Efforts Under the Militia Construction 14th Five-Year Plan section for evidence of the shift back to prioritizing national defense). Some problems relate to the infrastructure that supports training, including finite fiscal resources and limited equipment; outdated and insufficient training facilities; and too few qualified instructors, including for emerging domain subjects. Other problems relate to the content of training itself, such as focus on emergency response at the expense of wartime capabilities and emphasis on the skills of the individual or squad rather than the capabilities of a whole formation or system. Still more problems relate to implementation, including non-uniform standards and lenient evaluations. In particular, authorities are vigilant against lax training that delivers more pageantry than skill development. The willingness of individuals to join militias and of entities (for example, enterprises) to organize militias has been further negatively affected by concerns such as lost wages, injury liability, and lost production time. Fundamentally, authorities worry that many militia personnel lack a strong sense of military identity and commitment to the mission of China’s armed forces.

These and other factors have reportedly led to serious consequences, impairing the ability of these forces to perform the wartime tasks envisioned by authorities. For example, in 2020, an MSD commander in Hebei said of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) militia unit (hereafter, fendui [分队], referring to a group of militia personnel at the battalion, company, platoon, or squad level) that prior to a raft of reforms around training quality, the discrepancy between organization, training, and evaluation and actual combat was large, and that poor understanding of realistic combat drills and unsystematic and non-standard training constrained their fighting capabilities. In cyberspace, militias and other types of reserve forces have struggled to integrate with campaign-level PLA exercises, likely due to a lack of talent. Enterprises in Inner Mongolia have actively organized militia forces but have been reluctant to dispatch them. According to the leadership of one MSD in Liaoning in 2018, anxiety about accidents involving militia personnel increased as militia training requirements became more rigorous. As a result, militia forces were training less or skipping training altogether. Even when training, forces that have to pay expenses out-of-pocket have had little “enthusiasm” for what was asked of them.

Efforts Under the Militia Construction 14th Five-Year Plan

One of the mechanisms that China’s national-level authorities use to shape and direct militia development throughout the country toward a shared goal is the five-year plan (FYP). On October 9, 2021, the State Council and CMC NDMD issued the Militia Construction 14th FYP. This document is not public, but it almost certainly outlines overarching objectives and priorities for building militia forces, like the better-known “14th FYP for National Economic and Social Development” (NESD 14th FYP) does for the economy. As with the NESD 14th FYP, provincial and sub-provincial authorities develop their own MC 14th FYPs according to local conditions and more specific requirements; there is confirmation or indirect evidence of provincial-level MC 14th FYPs for 21 out of 31 provincial-level jurisdictions in China. Based on direct descriptions of the document in Chinese military media, the CMC NDMD’s reported priorities, sub-national regulations issued in recent years, and other information, the MC 14th FYP likely includes the following objectives and priorities:

• Increasing focus on militia development


• Cementing the orientation of militia forces toward wartime requirements


• Progressing development toward a “strong” force after early downsizing efforts


• Optimizing funding and use of financial resources


• Integrating militia equipment management with the PLA’s equipment system


• Strengthening militias’ sense of belonging to the armed forces through nationwide regulation


• Increasing investment in and modernization of militia military training bases

According to a 2025 investigation into militia force development under the MC 14th FYP that the Editorial Department of China Militia organized, this national-level plan is notable because it focused directly on militias. During the 13th FYP period, militia construction was handled under the broader “China Military Reserve Force Construction ‘13th FYP’” (我军后备力量建设“十三五”规划; 2016-2020). The formation of national and sub-national plans dedicated to militia development very likely reflects growing expectation within the CMC NDMD that the PMD system (as well as relevant civilian authorities) resolve the longstanding impediments to an effective militia force. One early 2025 expanded meeting of the CMC NDMD Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee demanded that authorities “truly pay attention, truly exert effort, truly implement, and truly achieve results“ (做到真上心, 真用力, 真落地, 真见效) in national defense mobilization work (of which militia force construction is a part). Under the MC 14th FYP, militia construction is being considered a political task in implementing the CMC chairman responsibility system (军委主席负责制) — thereby linking militia reforms to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s personal leadership of China’s armed forces through his role as CMC chairman — and a major task in consolidating an integrated national strategic system and capability (一体化国家战略体系和能力).

The MC 14th FYP has likely cemented the militia’s orientation toward wartime requirements. The aforementioned China Militia investigation highlights that a CMC NDMD “militia construction situation analysis and work promotion conference” (convened on an unspecified date) changed the rhetorical formulation that encapsulates militia functions from “respond to emergencies, respond to war” (应急应战) to “respond to war, respond to emergencies” (应战应急). In this, the primary focus of militia construction has become military-oriented war preparations rather than civilian-oriented emergency response roles, even though militias still shoulder both responsibilities and sources still use the former formulation frequently. It is possible that this change occurred in 2018, in the middle of the 13th FYP; a 2018 PLA Daily article about a “situation analysis” conference used this formulation to describe militia work. It is also possible this change occurred earlier. In 2016, the wider NDMS’s emphasis began shifting back to war mobilization capabilities after years of relative focus on supporting economic development and emergency response. In prioritizing preparations and capabilities for war, militia forces have maintained their pre-existing “main” orientation toward wartime support roles rather than reverting to a “main” orientation of “directly participating in war” (see the section titled The Goals and Challenges of Militia Construction for more details on the history of this point).

Figure 1: Grassroots authorities in Dongguan, Guangdong, hold a militia work meeting in 2022 and promote the “real”-to-”strong” transformation (Source: Sun0796)

The national-level MC 14th FYP likely also conceptualized militia work as deepening a transformational process that began in 2018, moving past earlier force reduction goals and seeking to overcome trickier organizational problems so authorities could increasingly turn to improving the efficacy of militia forces. In 2018, two rhetorical formulations emerged to guide militia work. One describes reforming militia forces “from large to powerful, from capable to elite” (由庞大走向强大、由精干走向精锐; alternatively, 从强大走向精锐). The second describes a transformation from “getting real” to “getting good” and “getting strong” (由“实起来”向“好起来”、“强起来”转变). While the former rhetoric, which refers equally to a downsizing goal and next steps, likely captures the long-term objective, the latter refers to a phased implementation plan. In 2018, the CMC NDMD issued trial measures for militia-related work that likely stipulated forces be “real” by 2018, “good” by 2019, and “strong” by 2020. In this, becoming “real” likely meant overcoming not only impractically large force sizes and structural emphasis on outdated modes of conflict (the focus of early reforms, as discussed below), but also problems like repetitious organization (重复编兵), fake enlistment (虚假编兵), and disparities between organization, training, and real-world use (编训用脱节).

Despite the likely 2020 deadline, Chinese military media, provincial and sub-provincial militia work meetings, and other sources have continued to frame militia work using this “real”-to-”strong” rhetoric throughout the MC 14th FYP period. When asked about how to conduct “high-quality” militia organizational work, unspecified persons affiliated with CMC NDMD-subordinate institutions (机关) told China Militia journalists in a 2025 interview that authorities should seek to achieve this transformation and reiterated the need to resolve the types of organizational challenges named above.

Under the MC 14th FYP, authorities were reportedly tasked with “building muscle” while maintaining the current scale of the militia force (规模不变) by continuing to reform approaches to force organization, optimizing resource allocation, and strengthening combat capabilities. This contrasts with militia construction efforts during the 13th FYP and earlier stages of broader “below-the-neck” (脖子以下) military reforms. These earlier reform periods placed more focus on reducing the number of militia fendui and personnel nationwide, building up “new-type” or “new-quality” fendui within emerging domains like cyber, and crafting a sleeker but more capable and modern force. “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (a government-issued white paper) stated in 2019 that authorities were “streamlining the number of primary militia nationwide, driving deeper reform of militia and reserve forces in their size, structure and composition” to enable “integrated development” of reserve and active-duty forces and accelerating the transformation of militia forces from mainly supporting the ground force to supporting multiple military services.

This “building muscle” task suggests that authorities had largely completed downsizing efforts, began turning their attention to more granular organizational issues, and were supposed to start becoming effective by focusing on training-related challenges. The “real”-to-”strong” rhetoric also suggests this shift by instructing authorities to progress beyond “getting real” to focus on becoming “good” and “strong.” Essentially, the MC 14th FYP likely signaled that the force reduction was complete but that militia work generally remained in a transitory state between addressing harder organizational problems and improving troop efficacy. The “large”-to-”elite” formulation remains relevant to understanding the overall trajectory of militia forces, but emphasis is likely now on the latter objective: moving from “capable to elite.” The structural reforms aimed at modernizing the composition of militia forces by focusing on recruitment from emerging domains may not be complete, but this question requires further research. The aforementioned CMC NDMD-affiliated interviewees reiterate this as an important area of work.

The MC 14th FYP likely seeks to facilitate these militia modernization objectives in a number of ways, including by guiding authorities to modernize militia training facilities and to issue policies that encourage militia participation throughout society. Both of these subjects are discussed in more detail below. Additional efforts include reforming financial support for militia development and militias’ access to needed equipment. In recent years, the CMC NDMD has reportedly sought to optimize the direction and amount of funding provided for militia work. The CMC NDMD has also sought to build a “comprehensive support standards system” (综合保障标准体系) to ensure that financial resources are focused on combat power. The CMC NDMD has also reportedly striven to bring militia equipment support into the “whole-military weapons equipment support system” (全军武器装备保障体系) and introduced a “new model” of equipment warehouse management to MSD authorities. Since the MC 14th FYP was adopted, local authorities have reportedly used a variety of methods (for example, self-procurement and pre-requisitioning) to improve access to equipment and advanced technologies.

Modernizing Militia Training Bases

The MC 14th FYP likely focuses on improving investment in and the quality of militia military training bases (民兵军事训练基地; MMTB). For example, a news report on the Shanxi PMD’s May 2025 inspection of city-level bases referenced requirements set by the national MC 14th FYP and Shanxi’s “Militia Training Base Construction Three-Year Development Plan” that called for such bases to be built or renovated and operational by the end of the year. Hunan, and at least one subordinate jurisdiction, have similarly issued 14th FYPs for MMTB development. A July 2025 news report on the opening of a district-level training base in Xiamen notes this was a “major project” of Fujian’s provincial MC 14th FYP. At the provincial and sub-provincial levels, authorities in Fujian have written militia training base construction into their NESD 14th FYPs. Within this activity, two notable trends in MMTB modernization include adopting new technology like simulation and virtual reality (VR) to strengthen training and establishing specialized bases for specific requirements. For example:

• Zhejiang authorities are pursuing a “one base, one specialty” (一基地一特色) model that mines local enterprises for applicable technologies, such as to establish MMTBs with ship navigation simulation, UAV coordination and confrontation simulation, virtual shooting ranges, and cyber ranges.


• Authorities created Dongguan, Guangdong’s first cyber militia training base in 2019 at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Cloud Computing Center (CAS CCC; 中国科学院云计算中心), to support cyber militia talent development and cyber offense-defense training.


• The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Second Division is using VR at its MMTB to simulate immersive realistic confrontation training and cultivate UAV operators, communications support, and other talent.


• Authorities in Guizhou have renovated a county-level MMTB to add a UAV specialized training field that comprises a multi-rotor drone training area, first-person-view (FPV) direct line training area, FPV comprehensive training area, and drone repair center.

Figure 2: Cyber militia fendui and center leadership outside of CAS CCC (Source: CAS CCC)

Another trend is coordinating MMTBs for use as multi-functional, comprehensive spaces that serve military and local government needs. Efforts to refine a three-tiered approach to organizing MMTBs, which were seen as early as 2011, are also continuing. Hunan and Hubei, for instance, both employ this model: provincial bases are the backbone, city bases are the main, and county bases are the supplement. This echoes the hierarchical approach to militia training more broadly (see Appendix A). These efforts are not only aimed at improving training but also optimizing available resources to prevent waste. Specific examples of these reforms include:

• Hebei authorities establishing provincial-level specialized emergency response training bases on the basis of four existing city-level MMTBs; the new MMTBs respectively focus on counter-terrorism and stability maintenance, forest firefighting, earthquake relief, and flood relief.


• Authorities in Shandong converting traditional single-function county-level MMTBs into comprehensive MMTBs that can serve militia, PAP, and public security training requirements.


• Hunan authorities implementing military-local government joint development of a provincial, city, and county multi-level MMTB system in which facilities are established at key locations (for example, where potential aerial threats are a prominent concern and along common PLA cross-region maneuver routes) and designed to focus on that area’s priority requirement while accommodating other needs like national defense education, student military training, civil air defense team training, and the needs of locally garrisoned troops.

Providing Benefits to Spur Participation

Under the MC 14th FYP, the CMC NDMD has guided every PMD to formulate and issue policies that induce recruits, enterprises, and other entities to participate in militia construction and training more enthusiastically. Since 2020, at least fifteen (and possibly as many as 22) provincial-level jurisdictions across China have issued (or are formulating) highly uniform sets of policy measures that seek to strengthen militia development in this manner, with all but one such measure issued in or after December 2023. Sub-provincial authorities have issued similar measures since at least 2018. Several of these regulatory documents specifically mention the national MC 14th FYP or their local MC 14th FYPs as a basis for the measures. The measures provide militia personnel and the entities that organize militia fendui (for example, enterprises, universities, work units, and social organizations) with tangible benefits and greater financial security in exchange for their service in China’s armed forces.

In at least fourteen of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions, provincial-level civilian and military authorities have jointly issued documents called “militia rights and benefits guarantee measures” (民兵权益保障办法), “primary militia preferential treatment and rights and benefits guarantee measures” (基干民兵优待和权益保障办法), and other close variations. As seen in Appendix B, the earliest of these was issued in December 2020 in Inner Mongolia, while the remainder were all issued in or after December 2023. In one of the fourteen jurisdictions (Henan), authorities have issued the measures for public comment but have not yet formally adopted them. Half of these policies are “trial” or “provisional” measures, indicating they will likely be formalized and potentially revised after an assessment of whether they achieve authorities’ goals. In September 2025, authorities in Guangdong deliberated their version of these measures, raising the number of provincial-level jurisdictions that have issued or are formulating the measures to fifteen.¹²⁹

Sub-provincial localities within at least seven additional provincial-level jurisdictions have also issued these measures, raising the possibility that corresponding provincial-level policies also exist. These local-level measures are seen in Anhui (in 2023), Chongqing (“recent years” before 2024), Jilin (2021), Shaanxi (2022), Shandong (2024), Sichuan (2022), and Qinghai (2023 and 2024). The earliest adoption of a similar measures package likely occurred in Panjin, Liaoning, in 2018. Delegates to Chongqing’s 2024 “Two Sessions” legislative event reportedly “hotly discussed” the adoption of such measures at the municipal (provincial) level, but it is unclear whether Chongqing authorities have done so.

Although variation exists, the rationale for these measures is highly uniform across all of the issued policies. The CMC NDMD’s reported goal is to “make militias truly find the feeling of being a ‘soldier’ and enjoy the treatment of a ‘soldier.’” According to Hunan province’s version of the measures, their goal is to stimulate the sense of honor, responsibility, and mission of the masses and various entities that support and participate in militia work. Many also refer to improving the “sense of gain” (获得感) felt by participants in militia work. As seen in discussions during Chongqing’s 2024 “Two Sessions” and media comments by elements of the Gansu PMD, the measures are understood as contributing to the construction of a “militia honors system” (民兵荣誉体系). The benefits are being highlighted in militia recruitment drives as incentives for joining. A 2021 China National Defense News article covering these measures in one Jilin city asserted that “preferential treatment policies are stimulating the passion of the majority of militiamen for training and work"; one member of a local militia reportedly said the forces have been given this much “warmth and caring” and therefore must repay it with “practical action.”

The measures are generally divided into two sets of policies, one catering to militia personnel and one catering to entities that organize militias. The measures most frequently apply to primary militias rather than ordinary militias. However, some jurisdictions offer a relatively limited set of benefits to all militias or extend the benefits of primary militia status to ordinary militias when the latter are on duty executing wartime and emergency response roles. The measures issued in each jurisdiction do not offer the exact same mix of specific policies, but nearly all of the measures in each issued policy fall within the same fifteen benefit categories. Benefits for militia personnel include monetary and non-monetary rewards for exemplary performance, hardship assistance, medical insurance to cover injuries sustained during training or deployment, duty subsidies, and preferential or discounted access to various services like national parks, banking, and transportation. Benefits for entities that organize militias include enrollment in military-civil fusion procurement channels, priority consideration for participation in political fora, and reimbursement or tax deductions for militia-related expenses. See Appendix B for more benefits and details.

Objectives of the Militia Military Training Outline

Another mechanism shaping and directing militia development throughout China toward a shared goal is the Militia Military Training Outline, which is very likely issued by the CMC NDMD and updated every few years. This document identifies the personnel, time, content, and quality requirements for organizing militia training, which focuses on proper politics, military theory, military operations, combat skills, and specialized functional skills. More specific annual militia training plans issued at the provincial and sub-provincial levels work toward the requirements of the MMTO and those set by each superior level in the PMD system, as informed by the needs of PLA theater commands and services. For more detail on the hierarchical militia training system, see Appendix A. Based on direct descriptions of this document in Chinese military media, the CMC NDMD’s reported priorities, activities within the PMD system in recent years, and other information, the current MMTO likely seeks to promote the following objectives:

• Ensuring that wartime requirements inform training content and methods


• Promoting the integration of technology to support training quality


• Achieving a rigorous, realistic combat standard


• Promoting foundational military skills, specialized skills, and mission operations skills


• Normalizing joint training between militia forces and the PLA


• Improving the quality of militia instruction


• Raising standards and methods for evaluating training


• Innovating methods for organizing training and assigning standby status for readiness

Figure 3: Militia personnel train for UAV operations in Heilongjiang (Source: China Militia)

A likely copy of an MMTO from the early 2010s is discoverable online and reveals the general structure of this document. It provides principles to guide militia military training organization and methods; objectives and requirements for training; standards to regulate the time spent in training; clarification on the responsibilities held by each level of the PMD system, military regions (now replaced by theater commands), and PLA services; and standards for evaluating training performance. This copy stipulated that militia training should be led by preparations for military struggle (以军事斗争准备为牵引); focused on key content associated with realistic combat requirements (训用一致; 根据实战需要); conducted using targeted training aimed at specific missions (针对性训练; 针对不同对象，采取不同方法); improved with technology (科技兴训); networked (网络化), simulated (模拟化), and “base-itized” (基地化), referring to the use of MMTBs; and linked (挂钩训练) and joint (联训联演) with active-duty military troops and military academic institutions. However, the copy may be incomplete based on descriptions of even older MMTOs, which likely included details on training content for more than 100 types of fendui.

The current MMTO covers the same range of topics and very likely highlights many of the same themes. According to a July 2023 China National Defense News article, the MMTO is an authoritative document that is the basic regulation determining what should be trained and evaluated, and how authorities should go about this work, including in relation to content, personnel, time, and quality. The article particularly references optimizing methods for organizing training, increasing the use of technology in education and training, scientifically pairing methods and content, and rebuilding the training supervision system. A 2025 National Defense Times article refers to a “new outline,” citing grassroots officials in Henan as asserting that edits therein further the realistic combat orientation. This article also suggests the current outline likely calls for innovating training models.

The CMC NDMD’s publicly reported priorities and activities likely provide further insight as to the current MMTO’s content. In recent years, the CMC NDMD has likely insisted that militia training implements “war-training unity” (战训一致), uses war to lead training (以战领训), and uses training to promote war (capabilities) (以训促战). The CMC NDMD has likely further emphasized technologically strong training (科技强训) and systemic joint training (体系联训) throughout the NDMS. A member of one CMC NDMD review group tasked with evaluating militia training across six PMDs in late 2024 said that militia forces should “specialize in training what the military forces lack.” The aforementioned CMC NDMD-affiliated interviewees told journalists that authorities should focus on optimizing training content that aligns with the missions and tasks assigned to specific types of militia forces, which includes a requirement to “supplement deficiencies and align [capabilities]” (补差、接口的要求). The CMC NDMD is also likely (almost certainly in some cases) focused on realistic training, joint training, effective evaluation, and organizational innovations, as described below. Also explored below is a tripartite training structure that, while not linked to NDMD activities directly, emerges from available sources as a new approach. Across many of these concepts and goals is an emphasis on resource sharing, which is likely also included in the current MMTO.

Notably, many of these themes are not new. Indeed, the focus on using technology was visible as early as 2008, and a “trend toward greater realism” and training with the PLA since the late 1970s or early 1980s. The difference today is likely the emphasis on, the details of, and expectations for rigorous implementation and institutionalization now that China’s leadership has (re)prioritized military preparedness over economic development and emergency response requirements (as noted in the The Goals and Challenges of Militia Construction and Efforts Under the Militia Construction 14th Five-Year Plan sections). A core element of PLA reforms in the last decade has been enabling integrated joint operations (一体化联合作战). Correspondingly, China's military leadership is focused on strengthening the joint operations system and broader efforts to build an integrated national strategic system and capability, of which the NDMS — and therefore militia forces — are a part. As a result, CMC NDMD and PMD-level authorities are likely increasingly insistent that militia training facilitates joint operations with the PLA and others, becomes more realistic to support the PLA’s requirements and the overall wartime orientation of militia forces, and implements innovations around organization and resource sharing to achieve these goals. The current MMTO likely reflects authorities’ anticipation that militia forces will be able to field a credible capability for supporting the PLA’s requirements under the “Centennial Military Building Goal” (建军一百年奋斗目标) by 2027.

Achieving Realistic Combat Standards

Conducting realistic combat training is almost certainly a central objective of the MMTO. In December 2022, a PLA Daily article asserted that, in recent years, realistic combat training (实案化训练) has become the “basic requirement” of militia training. One question asked by the aforementioned member of a CMC NDMD training review group was reportedly whether activities “meet the real combat standard.” At the start of 2025, the CMC NDMD CPP Committee held an expanded meeting, during which the department’s leadership called for continuing focus within the NDMS (and thus, militia forces) on “realistic combat, practicality, and actual effectiveness” (实战实用实效) in efforts to achieve the 2027 “Military Building Goal.”

Authorities are using methodological approaches and technology to increase the realism of militia training. In their methods, authorities are likely attaching importance to competitive and confrontation-style training. The CMC NDMD has reportedly been actively developing mass training competitions, as have subordinate authorities within the PMD system. The Anhui PMD’s 2025 annual training plan reportedly calls for realistic case confrontation training (实案化对抗训练) in alignment with the “spirit” of an expanded meeting held by the CMC NDMD and Eastern Theater Command CCP Committee. Whether the frequency of such training is increasing is unclear, but red-blue drills (that is, drills which pit a “red” force against a “blue” force in simulated confrontation) are a way this is achieved. For example, in 2023, the Fujian PMD organized air defense fendui for red-blue confrontation live-fire training. In June 2025, local authorities in Henan conducted a red-versus-blue drill involving teams of intelligence reconnaissance forces using drones and signals intelligence to discover their opponent’s location over efforts (such as decoys) to prevent discovery. According to these authorities, this training followed the current MMTO in part by exploring nighttime training — which has been in previous outlines but implementation of which was reportedly limited and outdated.

Another method highlighted in Chinese military media is “no contingency plan” (for example, 不设预案) or “no script” (for example, 无脚本) training. This method likely refers to training in which militia personnel are not told beforehand the specific situations they will face or precise tasks to be performed, creating a test of readiness, skill, adaptability, and “on-the-spot” (临机) decision-making in contrast to “formulaic” (程式化) approaches. For example, one MSD in Guizhou has reportedly reformed its live-fire militia artillery drills by eschewing fires from pre-determined “ideal distances,” “ideal positions,” and “ideal angles” and using “no script,” “no plan,” and “on-the-spot” methods. Authorities have used this method since at least 2006, but some recent reports suggest adoption may be spreading with language like “exploring the new path of responding to emergencies and responding to war under the condition of having no contingency plan.”

Technologically, VR and simulation are pursued as important enablers of realistic, effective, and confrontation-style training, as seen in the aforementioned examples of MMTB modernization. The VR system at Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Second Division’s MMTB can simulate more than twenty scenarios and is used to support normalized “realistic combat confrontation training.” One provincial-level “militia tactics simulation training center” can reportedly simulate 28 “classic” operations, including urban counter-terrorism and maritime search and rescue. A county in Jiangxi is using VR and simulation platforms to conduct individual training and coordinated training (协同训练) in transportation protection and engineering repair, as well as confrontation training under scenarios such as enemy sabotage of a rail bridge. Zhejiang PMD authorities have also organized district-level militia instructor training using a simulation platform for red-blue offense-defense confrontation drills. In addition to offering an (at least visually) immersive experience, these technologies are valued for enabling training in more risky subjects, keeping costs low, and overcoming other obstacles like limited access to equipment. How widespread VR and other technologies (like augmented reality) are is unclear. There are likely financial and technical considerations that would impact the ability of some jurisdictions to deploy these solutions.

Building Foundation, Special, and Mission Skills

One relatively new facet of the current MMTO likely relates to a tripartite structure for militia training. Although not directly linked to CMC NDMD activities, Chinese military media and local government documents reveal there are three types of instruction that all types of militia receive per the current MMTO. These are “common foundation” (共同基础), “specialized skill” (专业技能), and “mission operations” (任务行动) training. One annual training plan issued by a county-level jurisdiction in Inner Mongolia likely exemplifies the basic concept: the jurisdiction’s militia emergency response forces, specialized forces (including a communications support company), and special forces (namely, a cyber militia platoon for public opinion and propaganda) each received twelve days of training, with three days focused on the “common foundation,” four days focused on specialized skills, and five days focused on mission operations. Common foundation training includes instruction on individual tactics, light arms shooting, grenade throwing, first aid, and camouflage and protection. The first two examples in Appendix C likewise show that cyber militias receive common foundation and specialized training. Other unique forces, such as maritime militias in Hainan also train under this structure.

Authorities very likely adopted this tripartite training approach within the last decade, possibly as part of the MMTO issued in 2018 It does not appear in the likely early 2010s MMTO copy, but is referenced in local government sources and Chinese military media at least as early as 2017 and 2018. References to common foundation training and mission operations training in sources that also mention militias particularly appear to increase in 2019, suggesting their use likely started to become more common around this time (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Number of local government yearbooks, academic publications, and other sources that reference both militias and common foundation training or mission operations training, 2000-2025; results are likely not exhaustive, and the query structure is imprecise because sources that mention militias could be referencing these training approaches in relation to other forces (Source: Held by Recorded Future)

Figure 5: MMTB construction plan from Liping, Guizhou; fields are designated for shooting, grenade throwing, and camouflage and interference training (which constitute common foundation training), mission operations training, and likely specialized training for engineering support, firefighting and relief, flood prevention and rescue, and health and protection

(Source: Held by Recorded Future)

Training to Support Joint Operations

Of particular importance is the CMC NDMD’s work to normalize joint training and joint exercises between militias and the active-duty armed forces. The goal is to advance the deep integration of militia training with the joint operations training system (联合作战训练体系) so that, ultimately, authorities can mobilize these forces to effectively support joint operations in all domains. This project likely entails top-down changes to the militia system to enhance coordination between the PMDs, military services, local CCP committees, and government and party departments; clarify responsibilities; optimize resource allocation; and improve operating mechanisms. In 2022, the deputy secretary of the Tianjin Garrison CCP Committee described the joint training architecture this way: theater commands write militia mission operations training into the training system to coordinate joint training and exercises with key militia forces; PLA services lead linked and joint training to strengthen their command and coordination with militias; and the PMD system focuses on developing the specialized skills and command skills of militia personnel and the capability of fendui to act as cohesive units (成建制).

The frequency of joint training is unclear — and will likely vary across localities, theater commands, and fendui functions — but compared to the early 2000s, implementation of the related “linked training” concept is likely evolving from sporadic and situational to more institutional. Military-local joint exercises throughout the Hunan PMD are occurring on a regular schedule. One MSD in Hunan reports that its PLA service support militia fendui train with the PLA “every year.” At least one county-level PAFD in Henan has ensured joint training with militias is written into the annual training plans of locally garrisoned troops. Prior to 2016, Hainan authorities were already convening meetings involving military, law enforcement, and civilian forces no less than twice annually, in part to organize joint defense drills. Linked and joint approaches are also enabling militia forces to train using PLA equipment, facilities, and other resources (for example, instructors and teaching materials) to facilitate their development. In at least some training events, active-duty PLA and militia personnel are reorganized into mixed units. Key PLA service support militia fendui may be directly integrated with their PLA counterparts for some training.

Examples of joint training between the militia and PLA include:

• In an unknown year, militia fendui from Shandong reportedly participated in at least one Northern Theater Command joint air defense drill, in which they engaged in radar camouflage, optoelectronics confrontation (光电对抗), and other activities under a complex electromagnetic interference environment.


• In June and October 2023 and November 2024, the Eastern Theater Command Air Force organized daytime and nighttime joint bomb disposal and runway repair exercises with militia forces.


• In January 2025, the Jiangxi PMD organized a “supporting forces conducting mobile operations” drill, during which active-duty “officers and soldiers,” militias, and national defense mobilization support teams exercised for motorized maneuver, mitigating enemy reconnaissance and harassment, and establishing comprehensive support points.


• In January 2025, maritime militia forces likely supported the Eastern Theater Command’s “Strait Thunder-2025A” joint training drill as part of forces exerting “key area and chokepoint control” east and west of Taiwan. In May 2024, maritime militia forces aided the China Coast Guard (another component of China’s armed forces under the PAP) in an inspection and boarding drill near Taiwan in conjunction with Eastern Theater Command’s “Joint Sword 2024A” exercise.


• In June 2025, an element of the PLA Rocket Force organized militia forces for joint training to improve aligned assistance and support capabilities using an approach in which forces mobilized from different PAFDs were assigned to specialize in different tasks. Publicly reported areas of focus included logistics, road repair, and first aid. Eastern Theater Command Rocket Force has previously organized militia training that simulated nighttime firing of the Dongfeng-11 (DF-11) short-range ballistic missile.

Figure 6: An element of the PLA Rocket Force provides logistics training to militia in June 2025 (Source: PLA Rocket Force)

Likely under the objectives of crafting an integrated national strategic system and capability and strengthening with wider NDMS, advancing jointness expands beyond militia engagement with the PLA to include joint training that involves militia and various other military, non-military, and national defense mobilization forces. This also includes working to develop jointness between different fendui and local commands under the PMD system (for example, county-level PAFDs). Supporting militia training through other local resources (such as the resources of hi-tech enterprises) is also a priority. Authorities in Jiangsu are, for instance, turning to enterprises to provide cyber offense-defense environments for militia training. Other examples of these trends include:

• In June 2021, the Sansha Garrison organized island and reef militia forces for common foundation training and specialized training at a PLA Navy base, with some instruction delivered by PAP personnel.


• Likely in 2023, authorities in Anhui conducted joint training and evaluation that involved militia, public security, and civil air defense forces cooperating to repair a radar communications station. Civil air defense personnel provided video command, communications (集群对讲), and signals interference; militia forces repaired damaged radar station “lines"; and public security forces organized counter-UAV defenses.


• In December 2024, the Chongqing Garrison organized a six-day national defense mobilization joint drill and evaluation involving more than 1,000 militia personnel from twelve subordinate districts and counties that (during at least part of the training) formed combined arms groups (合成化编组), where specialized forces were the backbone and emergency response forces the main body.


• In February 2025, authorities in Sichuan organized a training in which militia technical backbone personnel and local technical experts cooperated to develop comprehensive communications support capabilities using equipment from a local communications company. The training particularly involved setting up network links and establishing a satellite base station, followed by a red-blue confrontation drill.


• In July 2025, authorities in Shanxi organized joint training among the PAP provincial zongdui (武警山西省总队), special police (特警), and militia forces that focused on controlling and mitigating a bomb threat. The militia supported mitigation efforts by quarantining the surrounding area and inspecting nearby persons while other forces worked to identify the origin of the threat.

Improving the quality of instruction that militia personnel receive is another line of effort that seeks to benefit from jointness. Likely since 2023 and under the CMC NDMD’s direction, authorities are conducting “militia military training teaching methods demonstration month events” (民兵军事训练教学法示范月活动) that promote cross-jurisdiction exchanges to improve the quality of militia instructors and other key personnel. During the 2024 events, the CMC NDMD “actively explored” tiered training for militia instructors such that the NDMD was responsible for “demonstration subjects” (示范课目), the PMDs responsible for “key and difficult subjects” (重难点课目), and MSDs responsible for “standardized subjects” (范化课目). For example, PMDs organized training in the use of meteorological observation equipment while MSDs organized training for rifle handling and operating a ship. Although how frequently the NDMD itself organizes such training is unclear, demonstration month events are a recurring approach to raising training quality. The CMC NDMD is also guiding PLA theater commands to engage with key militia instructors through on-site exchanges and mutual research during these events. In one 2024 demonstration month event, the Hunan PMD organized training for more than 380 militia instructors from subordinate MSDs and six other provincial-level jurisdictions, with representatives from a special warfare fendui of the Hunan PAP on-site for exchanges.

Appendix C provides additional examples of joint training and engagement between cyber militias and other military and non-military forces and resources.

Evaluating Performance with Accuracy

The CMC NDMD is likely making efforts to increase the rigor of militia training evaluation procedures. The CMC NDMD and every PMD have reportedly insisted on making proper training and evaluation (端正训风考风) a project of the CCP committee (党委工程) and the officers (主官工程). This language suggests an increasing expectation that sub-national authorities be highly attentive to achieving effective militia training and accurate evaluation of that training. More concretely, the CMC NDMD has reportedly “made a systematic deployment” (作出系统部署), “revising and improving” assessment methods, building a system of capability indicators, and conducting capability inspections and evaluations. The basic approach under the current MMTO is likely “train one, evaluate one; qualify one, and train again” (训完一个考核一个，合格一个再训一个), where “one” likely means a training subject (though this is not specified). The CMC NDMD is also regulating training standards and likely pushing the militia system to normalize supervision of training.

Authorities are using technology to support this work. At least in some jurisdictions, technical means are tracking training attendance, generating assessment results, and offering a clear view of mission execution. According to the leadership of the Guizhou PMD War Preparation Construction Bureau, the simulation systems used to achieve realism also provide “capability portraits” that assign numerical scores to skill categories like monitoring and early warning, analysis and judgment, tracking and tracing, and coordination and cooperation. There are further calls to establish a “specialized capability certification system” aligned to national vocational qualification standards, which at least one province has done. Jiangsu authorities are issuing militia “one expertise, many skills” certifications for eight positions, including UAV operator and network engineer.

Corresponding to the wider emphasis on jointness, there is reportedly a requirement to establish an integrated joint evaluation (一体化联合考评) mechanism. In one conception of this, written in the context of strengthening PLA service support militia fendui specifically, the PMD system focuses on evaluating common foundation training outcomes along the existing administrative hierarchy, while the PLA services are mainly responsible for evaluating the development of specialized skills with organizational support from the PAFDs. Training performance outcomes are written into the annual quantitative management targets of the MSDs and PAFDs. Evaluations cover, through separate assessments, the mission operations capability of fendui acting as units (成建制) and their ability to act jointly with active-duty forces.

Figure 7: A cyber militia network equipment maintenance fendui undergoes final assessment after centralized training organized by PMD authorities, likely at the Hunan University of Science and Technology’s School of Computer Science and Engineering (计算机科学与工程学院) (Source: Held by Recorded Future)

Organizing to Sharpen Readiness

The current MMTO likely directs authorities to optimize methods of organizing militia forces to undergo training. The aforementioned CMC NDMD-affiliated interviewees highlighted the importance of innovating training organization in their summary of where authorities should focus their attention, such as by differentiating groups based on qualities and identities, conducting cross-regional joint training for small specializations (新小特专业跨区域联训), and conducting cross-regional centralized joint training (跨区域集中联训).²⁷² In one innovation emphasized by Chinese military media, authorities seek to improve year-round militia readiness by pairing cyclical annual training with a “standby” status. However, many militia personnel likely do not receive training each year. Authorities are also pursuing “centralized” and “distributed” training methods to account for common foundation training requirements, the demands of specialized skillsets, and other challenges. Appendix A further discusses approaches to organizing training under the PMD system’s hierarchical structure.

The core of the militia training regime is annual “centralized training” (集中训练), also called “intensive training” (集训), which involves a group of personnel assembled for multi-day instruction in common foundation skills, specialized skills, and mission operational skills. The MMTO sets general time requirements for training based on the types of personnel and forces to be trained, as well as other factors (see Appendix D). In general, militia personnel today may be commonly expected to undergo seven to twelve days of core training annually. This likely does not include additional time spent in evaluations, certain drills, and other activities. Militia forces also undergo annual evaluations and skill-specific evaluations, get called up for inspections, join mission drills and joint drills with the PLA, receive supplemental training, participate in arms competitions, and compete in capture-the-flag events in the case of cyber militias. Sometimes evaluation and training occur at MMTBs, and at other times take place in unfamiliar terrain.

Figure 8: The cyber offense-defense fendui of the Jilin MSD participates in a cyber offense-defense specialized skills competition and centralized training at a local vocational school (Source: Changbai Bing Ge)
The trend for several decades has been toward consolidation of centralized training, particularly through the use of county and city-level MMTBs under the concept of “base-itization.” One likely increasingly common approach since approximately 2018 to organizing forces for centralized training is “rotation training and standby” (轮训备勤; RT&S) or “centralized” RT&S at MMTBs. In this approach, batches of personnel (分批) are trained at different periods (分期) throughout the annual training cycle. For instance, an MSD in Jiangxi once divided the primary militia organized by more than 340 grassroots PAFDs under its jurisdiction into twelve batches and trained one batch per month. Note that at least some local authorities in China were doing batch training like this by the 1990s. What has likely changed is the breadth of adoption in recent years and emphasis on the “standby” concept, as well as the relationship between “standby,” “rotation training,” “centralized training,” and “base-itized” training.

Figure 9 shows that references to RT&S-related concepts have likely emerged largely since 2018, in contrast to more common and general concepts like “rotation training” and “standby.” For example, only 47% of over 7,000 sources referencing militias and rotation training since 2000 were published in or after 2018, likely indicating the commonality of this concept prior to that year. In contrast, 87% of 1,003 sources referencing militias and RT&S were published in or after 2018, likely indicating its more recent adoption post-reform.

Figure 9: Percentage of local government yearbooks, academic publications, and other sources that reference militias and the named concept in or after 2018, out of all publications with the same references since 2000; concepts calculated independently; results are likely not exhaustive, and the query structure is imprecise because sources that mention militias could be referencing RT&S in different contexts (Source: Held by Recorded Future)

Authorities are pursuing the RT&S approach to improve year-round militia readiness. According to statements by the leadership of one MSD in Jiangxi, RT&S integrates training and use and ensures that militia forces can be called up and effectively employed when there is a need. The approach is linked to the goal of achieving “normal state standby” (常态备勤) among militia forces. Chinese military media coverage highlighting how authorities are implementing RT&S refer to a new organizational system (体制) intended to support this effect. For instance, some authorities are categorizing forces into normal state standby fendui, emergency response reserves fendui, and war readiness duty fendui (战备值班分队). Under this or similar models, the annual training period is likely a given fendui’s period to be on standby for deployment. Some authorities are likely considering additional factors, like anticipated tasks in a given season, when assigning standby status. In 2020, the commander of an MSD in Hunan called for a readiness level classification (分级战备) method, in which the last, current, and next batch of militias to be called up for rotation training come into and fall out of readiness status. In practice, the next batch of forces would likely be considered to have low readiness since they would have gone the longest without training.

Despite the apparent focus on readiness, many (possibly most) militia forces likely do not undergo training every year. The likely early 2010s copy of the MMTO only required training for a fraction of militia forces (see Appendix D). There is a concept of “full personnel coverage” (全员覆盖) or “all personnel participate in training” (全员参训) likely linked to the RT&S approach, which may suggest this expectation is changing, but the concept’s meaning is unclear. One interpretation is that all enlisted militia personnel in a given jurisdiction are trained each year. In 2018, an MSD in Hebei celebrated that its “primary militia training participation rate reached 100% per regulations.” However, some local government documents issued in and after 2018 continue to indicate that training tasks are only assigned to a portion of available forces. For example, one 2024 document indicates a Heilongjiang county should maintain the size of its primary militia at 460 personnel, but the “annual basic training task” only covers 104 people. A 2021 document indicates that a Shandong district has 48 fendui of various types that comprise nearly 2,000 personnel, yet only 302 personnel are designated for training. References to “all personnel” in sources that also mention militias have been rising since the early 2000s, but there is no clear increase in usage that occurred around 2018. Ultimately, definitive conclusions about what this stipulation means and its novelty remain elusive as of this writing.

Despite the trend toward consolidation and use of MMTBs, there are nuances to how authorities organize militia training for different subjects. These nuances likely primarily serve to accommodate the development of highly specialized skill sets and other challenges associated with mustering civilian professionals for extended periods. The overarching concept is likely that common foundation subjects, emergency response subjects, and general use specializations use centralized training methods, more niche specialized skills and special forces — including fendui for cyber offense-defense and frequency spectrum management — use what is called “distributed training” (分散训) or “separate training” (分开练), and mission operations training relies “joint training” (联合训). One 2021 county-level document identifies a range of these methods, including the stipulation that mission operations training should rely on participation in PLA theater command exercises and the drills of military and local government authorities at all levels. Other methods also exist; in one case, the personnel of an engineering repair fendui were assigned to work at a "roadway and bridge” enterprise for four months to develop specialized skills. See Appendix C for additional examples of centralized and distributed approaches to training among cyber militias.

Additionally, there are likely nuances MMTBs authorities use for training. For example, the commander of Guilin Garrison in Guangxi has promoted this pattern for ensuring training quality: common foundation training relies on nearby MMTBs for cooperative training (合训), specialized training relies on training bases (not necessarily MMTBs) with the relevant capabilities for overall training (统筹集训), and mission operations training relies on regions where future operations may occur or PLA service training bases for joint training (合演训).

Assessments of Progress in Militia Construction

The CMC NDMD likely assesses positive progress throughout both the militia force and the wider NDMS within which they sit. This national-level authority assessed “steady” improvement in NDMS capabilities in 2022 and a “significant leap” in 2023. In late 2024 and early 2025, CMC NDMD-affiliated personnel, speaking with China Militia journalists for various news articles, said that authorities have “comprehensively improved the capability for all levels and all types of personnel to carry out diversified tasks,” as well as:

• Begun correcting “problems such as sluggish and loose militia training," in part by introducing more competition in the system to "arouse passion for combat"


• Gradually solved the “old big difficult” problem of insufficient training facilities


• Persisted in advancing the transformation and upgrade of military training


• Done a good job in intensifying the organization of training (组训), using specialized instruction (专长化任教) and simulated training methods, and in standardizing evaluations


• “Actively consolidated” results from the “militia military training teaching methods demonstration month events”


• Improved conditions related to militia training expenses and access to equipment


• Continuously strengthened new-quality force construction

Chinese military media journalists further assert (in their reports documenting activity throughout the militia system, but not attributed to comments from CMC NDMD-affiliated individuals) that authorities have “initially achieved” the transformation from “large”-to-”elite” and developed stronger “bones and muscles"; improved the alignment of militia requirements with skilled personnel, with recruitment of veterans, CCP members, and high-quality talents increasing; standardized the “shape” of militia forces, with emphasis being placed on organization in large- and medium-sized cities, all types of enterprises, development zones, and emerging domains; rectified problems like repetitious organization; worked to emphasize the abilities of fendui to carry out missions as cohesive units (成建制) rather than the quality of individual soldiers; established a “new model” at every level of the PMD system for militia training that is joint with the PLA, facilitated by military academic experts, and makes use of local resources; enlarged training that assists and supports war; and made progress improving militia forces’ access to advanced equipment. Journalists observe that after a series of intensive efforts to normalize training supervision work, correct lenient and unrealistic training styles, and rectify other problems, the “training situation has reversed"; the quality and effectiveness of militia basic training have steadily increased; and mechanisms for supervision, punishment, and reward are more robust.

At the same time, it is still common for Chinese military media to report that authorities have assessed significant shortcomings among their militia forces. For example, while assessing their national defense mobilization capabilities in late 2024, the Fujian PMD found deficient ability among militia cadres to lead forces in executing missions and lax training unfit for the requirements of war. In mid-2025, a county-level PAFD in Guangdong organized an investigation into realistic combat training and the conduct of diversified military tasks, finding major problems that were constraining local militia forces’ capabilities.

As indicated in the Methodology, the foregoing assessments in Chinese military media are credible but not necessarily authoritative. While statements attributed to CMC NDMD-affiliated individuals are somewhat more credible and more likely reflective of actual viewpoints within the CMC NDMD than observations made by journalists, all Chinese military media content is very likely influenced (at least to some extent) by political factors and propaganda objectives. For different pieces of media, objectives likely include stoking domestic enthusiasm for militia work, driving greater effort among authorities implementing reforms, or generating international deterrence effects by portraying militias as increasingly effective. This can likely lead to instances in which the weaknesses of militia forces are overstated or their strengths exaggerated.

Outlook

China’s militia forces are likely developing a credible capability for supporting the PLA in future conflicts, but slowly and likely unevenly. Progress toward authorities’ goals almost certainly continues to face obstacles posed by local budget constraints, bureaucratic inattention, and the contradictions inherent to cultivating nationwide military capabilities within the civilian (including private) economy. Development is likely also to be uneven across localities because certain jurisdictions, such as those near potential conflict zones, likely face greater pressure to improve militia readiness. The slow pace of reform is clear in the observable history: a government white paper published in 2013 highlighted efforts to improve militia structure, equipment, and training — areas in which notable challenges remain more than a decade later.

There are also specific indications that incomplete implementation and missed deadlines hinder today’s objectives. It appears that not all provincial-level jurisdictions have passed a militia benefits package as directed by the CMC NDMD. Five years since militia forces were likely supposed to have “gotten strong,” that development goal has not changed. If the intended effect of the aforementioned “all personnel” concept is to ensure all militia forces receive training each year, this is another area where implementation is facing challenges. Other problems also remain; the rotational training format continues, for instance, to rely on short training periods and long annual cycles, which can negatively affect force capabilities, especially when the force is organized inefficiently.

Still, pockets of excellence are likely emerging, especially in domains where militias can put their skills to use during peacetime. In cyberspace, these pockets of excellence include cyber militias at the cybersecurity companies Qihoo 360 and Antiy. In the maritime domain, the Sansha maritime militia and others have actively contributed to enforcing China’s claim over the South China Sea for more than a decade. The “interoperability and integration” of these maritime militia forces are growing “in scale and sophistication,” according to a 2024 assessment by the United States Department of Defense. Of course, no militia has wartime experience; whether this part-time component of China’s armed forces will function effectively under such pressure remains unknown.

More important than the capabilities of China’s militia forces today is the implications of their reorientation toward wartime requirements, the issuance of the MC 14th FYP, legal reforms to improve the benefits of participating in militia construction, and signs of other reforms since 2018: an increasing focus on systematically improving this component of China’s armed forces. National military and civilian authorities have begun taking necessary steps to guide and support the militia system in overcoming longstanding challenges to recruiting and training an effective force. The elevation of militia work into its own 14th FYP and the coordinated push to pass measures addressing the concerns of militia personnel and the entities (for example, enterprises) in which they are organized provide the clearest indication of this.

Recent evolutions in the militia system should prompt governments, militaries, and national security-focused analysts to begin monitoring (or intensify current monitoring of) militia work in China. Specifically, this analysis should focus on whether militia forces in areas relevant to potential conflicts are starting to outgrow the common understanding of them as neglected, ill-equipped, poorly trained, and primarily oriented toward non-war missions like peacetime social stability. These and other challenges will almost certainly remain relevant to right-sizing China’s militia forces (the capabilities of which Chinese military media may exaggerate, as noted above), but their development is an important aspect of Xi Jinping’s efforts to strengthen China’s armed forces. Thus, these problems may become relevant to a diminishing proportion of forces over time. Growing emphasis on correcting militia deficiencies must be considered when evaluating China’s total military strength relative to that of other countries, as well as China’s ability to mobilize society in support of a war effort. Militia forces likely have the potential to provide a numerical and structural advantage in some domains, such as cyberspace.

Major changes in the level of attention, investment, and time devoted to militia work — such as a confirmed shift to training all militia personnel annually or indications that time spent in training is increasing — can likely serve as a warning indicator about China’s intentions with regard to Taiwan, as authorities would very likely mobilize militia forces to contribute to any future war. This is particularly the case with militia forces in jurisdictions that are most relevant to a Taiwan scenario, like Fujian. Prior to China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979, militia forces in Yunnan and Guangxi were built up, which reportedly entailed exchanging old weapons for new, undergoing intensified training, and deploying to the border (particularly logistics forces). Changes to militia force posture in areas like Hainan province or Sansha City are likely similarly relevant to assessing risks in the South China Sea.

Authorities are currently formulating China’s 15th FYP. A new iteration of the militia construction plan will likely run from 2026 through 2030. It will likely entail continued emphasis on passing regulations to guarantee militia rights and benefits, upgrading MMTBs, and financing militia force development. A key question is whether the development stage will change; if authorities begin moving away from the “getting real” to “getting good” and “getting strong” formulation, it will likely (depending on the rhetoric used) indicate substantial progress in improving militia training and war preparedness. Given the geographic and functional complexity of the militia system, continued research on specific forces would further refine understanding of China’s reserve military capabilities.

Appendix A: The Militia Training Hierarchy

Militia training is primarily organized under the four-tier hierarchy of the PMD system. According to “China’s National Defense in 2008” (a government-issued white paper), the PMDs are the backbone, MSDs are the main body, county-level PAFDs are the foundation, and grassroots PAFDs are supplemental. Authorities continue to use this hierarchical approach, though the specifics have likely evolved as they seek greater efficiency and better outcomes — authorities have discussed how to “improve” this tiered arrangement since at least 2017. The hierarchical system is also involved in evaluating outcomes at lower levels. As of 2025, Chinese military media alludes to this pattern of tiered training and supervision work: one level is observed by another, one level leads another (一级做给一级看、一级带着一级干). The CMC NDMD serves as a fifth tier, inspecting training performance across PMDs and, in some cases, organizing training.

According to a 2013 description of training responsibilities, the PMDs mainly provide training for new PAFD leadership, militia air defense missile fendui, “a portion” of specialized technical backbone personnel for which organizing training is challenging, and militia instructors; the MSDs mainly provide training for anti-aircraft artillery, communications, engineering, anti-chemical and other specialized technical fendui; and the county-level PAFDs mainly provide training for ground artillery, emergency response, infantry, and aligned specialization fendui.

The essential elements of this approach remain true today, with a division of labor based on roles, resources, and expertise. For example, in 2021, the Inner Mongolia PMD took responsibility for organizing jurisdiction-wide UAV operators, militia instructors, and the backbone forces of the border defense cavalry militia. Per Heilongjiang’s militia work regulations (last updated in 2018), county-level PAFDs are primarily responsible for militia military training. However, PAFDs and their superior MSD can jointly conduct training for challenging specialized technical subjects. During “militia military training teaching methods demonstration month events” in Chongqing, the provincial-level garrison command provides militia instructor “training, evaluation, and arms competitions” each year, while directly subordinate (that is, likely MSD-level) PAFDs organize “general training and evaluation (普训普考) and implement specialized instruction (专长化任教). This pattern likely aligns with the distribution of responsibilities during demonstration month events as led by the CMC NDMD in 2024 (see Training to Support Joint Operations).

A 2018 China National Defense News article on innovating training organizational approaches emphasized the following pattern to facilitate jointness and mitigate training that is overly focused on local missions. County-level PAFD train emergency response fendui and militia forces with “ordinary” specializations, which afterward undergo centralized joint training at superior-level “training centers"; technical fendui that are not highly specialized are trained at the MMTBs of their current level using the “big specialization, small centralization” (大专业小集中) and “small specialization, big centralization” (小专业大集中) methods; and superior levels provide unified training for highly specialized technical forces. The article further calls for “exploring” a two-level method in which PAFDs organize foundation training (基础训练) for “small specializations” while MSDs organize training for “big specializations” and the personnel of militia special forces (for example, cyber militias).

Other significant reforms may be occurring. For example, authorities in Yueyang, Hunan, have stripped PAFDs of their responsibilities to implement militia training because insufficient facilities and instructors greatly impacted training quality. These PAFDs now only muster and manage militia personnel, while the MSD provides unified training and evaluation. However, this may be an isolated case.

It is unclear how this hierarchical structure accommodates “distributed training” formats such as in-place training at enterprises (see the Organizing to Sharpen Readiness section), though authorities continue to supervise forces using these formats (see Appendix C for an example).

Appendix B: Militia Rights and Benefits Policy Rollout

Source: RecordedFuture
Source Link: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinas-militia-forces-train-to-get-strong-in-the-new-era