Summary On July 23, 2024, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a malicious ZIP file containing a Python-based information stealer now tracked as Connecio. A threat actor distributed this file days after the July 19, 2024, single content update for CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor — which impacted Windows operating systems — was identified and a fix was deployed. The […

Summary

On July 23, 2024, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a malicious ZIP file containing a Python-based information stealer now tracked as Connecio. A threat actor distributed this file days after the July 19, 2024, single content update for CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor — which impacted Windows operating systems — was identified and a fix was deployed. The ZIP file uses the filename CrowdStrike Falcon.zip in an attempt to masquerade as a Falcon update. CrowdStrike Intelligence does not currently attribute the analyzed activity to any named adversary.

Technical Analysis

Technical analysis is based on the ZIP archive (SHA256 hash: 5ba542fcfa45d50c0d65dda4dbbd7a28f737a2fc53841ddaab7f68ae1cdf5183) that was uploaded to a public malware repository on 2024-07-23 12:09 UTC with the filename CrowdStrike Falcon.zip. This archive contains the files shown in Table 1.

Filename	SHA256 Hash
Readme.txt	56cbd8ce60f18d4cececfa703a92c0188dd81ed97b4de12e3f120d7ce736225a
CrowdStrike Falcon.exe	21653e267a6c7e4f10064ad2489dba54e04612cc7ce4043b8c8dcaf8b39210d6

Table 1. Archive CrowdStrike Falcon.zip content

The file CrowdStrike Falcon.exe is a self-extracting RAR (SFX) that contains and executes a Python-compiled executable; this executable contains the Connecio information stealer.

The text file Readme.txt contains instructions for potential victims to disable Windows Defender and execute the malicious executable present in the archive (Figure 1).

 

Upon execution, the malicious file CrowdStrike Falcon.exe unpacks and invokes an information stealer written in the Python programming language that collects system information, the system’s external IP address (by making an HTTP GET request to the URL http[:]//ipinfo[.]io/[]?token=7fb82f5925fe8b), and data from multiple web browsers.

Then, the information stealer resolves its command-and-control (C2) servers by making HTTP GET requests to the Pastebin dead-drop URLs shown in Table 2.

Pastebin Dead-Drop URL	Description
https[:]//pastebin[.]com/FHfj1fYD	C2 server configuration
https[:]//pastebin[.]com/HeVWATy1	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) accounts to exfiltrate collected information via email
https[:]//pastebin[.]com/2diVWcDQ	List of cryptocurrency address patterns and potential replacements; the addresses are likely used for clipboard-hijacking cryptocurrency theft, as they match cryptocurrency addresses and the malware uses the Python library pyperclip to control the clipboard1

¹ https[:]//pypi[.]org/project/pyperclip/

Table 2. Pastebin dead-drop URLs

Recommendations

These recommendations can be implemented to help protect against the activity described in this report.

• Only accept updates delivered through CrowdStrike official channels and adhere to CrowdStrike support teams’ technical guidance


• Train users to avoid executing files from untrusted sources


• Check website certificates on the download page to ensure downloaded software originates from a legitimate source


• Use browser settings to enable download protection that can issue warnings regarding potentially harmful websites or downloads


• Block SMTP network connections to unknown servers when not required within the organization


• Block Pastebin web access when not required within the organization

Appendix

YARA Rule

This YARA rule detects common strings for the Connecio information stealer.

rule CrowdStrike_CSA_240846_01 : connecio python stealer  {     meta:         copyright = "(c) 2024 CrowdStrike Inc."         description = "Common strings for Connecio Python stealer"         reports = "CSA-240846"         version = "202407231719"         last_modified = "2024-07-23"         malware_family = "Connecio"     strings:         $ = "C0nn3c+10nz"         $ = "?token="         $ = "ACCOUNT(S) INFO COOKIE"         $ = "Firefox.get_password"         $ = "Brave.get_password"         $ = "Chrome.get_password"         $ = "MACHINE        : "     condition:         5 of them }

Falcon LogScale Queries

This Falcon LogScale query detects the activity described in this report.

// Indicators related to CSA-240846 case { in("SHA256HashData", values=["21653e267a6c7e4f10064ad2489dba54e04612cc7ce4043b8c8dcaf8b39210d6", "56cbd8ce60f18d4cececfa703a92c0188dd81ed97b4de12e3f120d7ce736225a", "5ba542fcfa45d50c0d65dda4dbbd7a28f737a2fc53841ddaab7f68ae1cdf5183", "d7c1be2d0b7d2714ff710676d228ac751c4eba280309e1241a9f7e441299a177"]); in("DomainName", values=["dshu.xyz", "klaxusonline.com", "mail.dshu.xyz", "theprofits.online", "web3versecoin.com", "xryptbx.com"]); in("RemoteAddressIP4", values=["139.99.232.135", "185.255.114.110", "185.255.114.63"]) } | table([cid, aid, #event_simpleName, ComputerName])

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

This table details the IOCs related to the information provided in this report.

Description	Value
C2 IP addresses	139.99.232[.]135:80 185.255.114[.]110:80185.255.114[.]63:80
SMTP exfiltration-sender accounts	send@dshu[.]xyz logs@web3versecoin[.]com logsmaster@xryptbx[.]com
SMTP exfiltration-recipient accounts	logs@theprofits[.]online info2024@klaxusonline[.]com frank@dshu[.]xyz 6000@xryptbx[.]com
SMTP exfiltration hosts	mail.dshu[.]xyz:465 web3versecoin[.]com:465 xryptbx[.]com:465

Table 3. IOCs

MITRE ATT&CK

This table details the MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques described in this report.

Tactic	Technique	Observable
Execution	T1059.006 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python	Connecio is written in the Python programming language
	T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File	Connecio lures the user into executing the malware executable
Command and Control	T1102.001 – Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver	Connecio uses Pastebin dead-drop URLs to resolve its C2 infrastructure
Exfiltration	T1048 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Connecio exfiltrates information over SMTP

Table 4. Described Connecio activity MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Cryptocurrency Addresses

The following table includes cryptocurrency addresses obtained from the dead-drop configuration URL.

Address

0x2DCC92C27C4429B506588012CaC53764780f3e3D

0x6c5E3Ea51B382C49839417dAF3c84E3dA603D12f

0xd23896016eC1Ef2D25Fb8899a4a3a38e0a92F9c1

13KadCbGWS4rzXiAyc7HHW2HDopN59hKa6

17tVNxknYnnkrvY3vN4Tw23fXQdSmn7CDU

1Q4V4c1d6Vmr1Bf9BWejixnF8XnfdY6m4s

bc1qfwx6sase663vranpr7mkf485ypz3nzvtl0xtld

bc1qlneepetqamw7vmfludvrjgnk7tjprzlcy5e293

bc1qr9euay9qsfwsgh2edeqfk0rpw90c9zl9f69kfk

bnb10nf3fc0xtfm6f7xfy6vjejnyq88ha7gjc8hx62

bnb130y4jppcnh2vmwc6u4kkktehswldmrk43l7nah

bnb1xg0dn3lj6ggekxptv4mg7u89uqqu73ezpxkhup

CrnP9VWgegWAFgKYHqsrLhxoWwBykAaHQDkz7A8njtMj

DMqCf1f3wCHncDdbHmNZa2AFwyVYDeVSRL

DMX3TTkhnDvB7nbhG3jn85U1bHedVsfgJs

Fep17BczJDfVeSHytKmCS1n2MBM5j6BVdVEkcN5H1eXJ

LcxgZpuNmbji8WfWrEpWHKDA41wGcRxJFe

LLGtBdhMb7DABq9Q1yDEGUXAvtn4CyPGh7

ltc1qg9k9ren5rmu65l9jy69lt7tqrl60s7u8e6gv9m

qz0zv0l5gqz5f69l8ezpwu8mpfhzv8lwruz5dh2h7p

qz9zwucyjf8jw7yhr3dm85ejslaesrrp9y3qh6x2h9

qzanj5umvjs3h6fjplzxh68lnm3hzl7djq9aky0xwn

t1KikBNAhHPWBTvDmzzcoUMJ8CKxo8dm2hF

TAZnA51ca5P2hpcjUwY6eqYvDL9fGzad3M

TFhAp8GYQiyYk3xGgDXoNDokDzKZnMoUuT

XiDCvcyAnTKEr6vQn7rjwpjH6tiwhEPPA5

XkarQqC1GGjuF8eQEhWeBifFTz4UyLG7z3

Xy4yi1Qr7UgEh4hSi8dLv7iANecm11MDGM

Table 5. Connecio-related cryptocurrency addresses

Additional Resources

Read other blog posts from CrowdStrike Intelligence regarding the Falcon content issue: 

• Falcon Sensor Content Issue from July 19, 2024, Likely Used to Target CrowdStrike Customers


• Likely eCrime Actor Uses Filenames Capitalizing on July 19, 2024, Falcon Sensor Content Issues in Operation Targeting LATAM-Based CrowdStrike Customers


• Threat Actor Uses Fake CrowdStrike Recovery Manual to Deliver Unidentified Stealer

 

Source: CrowdStrike
Source Link: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/threat-actor-distributes-python-based-information-stealer/