Operation Desert Storm
that were designed to counter Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) collection systems (Bird, 2004). The United States and allied forces countered these countermeasures with SIGINT and Electronic Warfare through exploitation empowered by long-term electronic warfare support and a holistic and simultaneous electronic attack approach.
Electronic Surveillance and Electronic Intelligence
Before the attack, with intelligence sourced from the DIA and JCS and collaborative help from the operational planning group, allied mission planners spent an unprecedented effort modeling Iraqi command, control, and communications infrastructure which included mapping the adversary’s IAD network and “containing performance parameters, kill probabilities and electromagnetic characteristics of the systems used” (Kopp, 1993). The revolutionary use of American Magnum spy satellites and airborne assets to track Iraqi military action, collect Iraqi electromagnetic emissions, and discern signals of interest from radars and radio frequency activity from noise was critical in the success of Desert Storm (Bird, 2004; Withington, 2022). This information allowed allied forces to establish an Electronic Order of Battle, an identification of the adversary’s strength, command structure, personnel disposition, units, and equipment (Coda, 2023a). Planners discovered a fatal weakness in Hussein's command structure: the hierarchical nature of the Iraqi military limits tactical and operational action if leadership is unable to actively communicate with their subordinates. Furthermore, during Electronic Surveillance, these planners discovered two critical Iraqi strengths/threats to American air superiority: Iraqis’ highly sophisticated Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and deployed Ground-Based Air Defenses (GBAD) protecting the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units (Withington, 2022). These systems combined command and control systems that used radar and
other utilities to detect, target, track, and attack offensive air capabilities.
Long term Electronic Intelligence collection allowed for U.S. aligned forces to determine where Iraqi IAD and GBAD systems were located and identify gaps or weakly defended zones in Iraqi’s air defense coverage (Coda, 2023c). Repeat ELINT collection allowed for analysts to intercept Iraqi signals and determine patterns of electromagnetic activity, developing information on Iraqi SA-2 batteries, when Iraqi forces switched off radars, and geographical or temporal gaps in radar coverage that could be exploited. The US Navy’s Operational Intelligence Centre’s Strike Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air Research team (SPEAR) used this information to further build an evolving and comprehensive order-of-battle of the Iraqi IADS/GBAD, identify and locate key nodes in the Iraqi IADS that would significantly degrade Iraqi air defenses, and draft simulation programs that modeled the Iraqi defenses (Withington, 2022). To deny these capabilities, U.S. forces planned to attack two electronic elements of IADS and GBAD, radar and radio communications; without these elements, Iraqi forces lacked situational awareness and thus command and control structures would become degraded or paralyzed (Withington, 2022).
Electronic Attack, Electronic Support, and Electronic Intelligence
Electronic warfare was crucial to the meaningful degradation of air defenses within a brief time. (Withington, 2022) When the conflict began, Iraqi defenses faced continuous electronic attacks by EF-111As and EA-6Bs, which jammed early warning and GBAD surveillance radars (Withington, 2022). U.S. Air Force EF-111A and USN/USMC EA-6B crews unleashed a massive amount of “noise and deception jamming signal… supported by the EC-130s' jamming of all known communications frequencies… [that] hid multiple waves of inbound strike aircraft and cruise missiles, while paralyzing much of Iraq's communications network” (Kopp, 1993).
Once the adversary’s network was paralyzed by the jamming, individual air and ground defenses would be forced to turn on their radars to target the invading aircraft and therefore expose themselves (Kopp, 1993). To detect and attack hidden surface-to-air missile sites (the IADs and GBADs mentioned earlier), the F-4 Phantom II (Wild Weasel) purposely entered Iraqi
airspace to be targeted by their radar tracking systems and counter-trace radar to its source and destroy surface-to-air missile batteries. The U.S. Air Force utilized airborne, kinetic attacks on radars with anti-radiation missiles to destroy key nodes and targets and remove radar systems, to expand gaps that the Wild Weasels exploited to enter the area and diminish Hussein’s command and control. Iraqi SAM missile sites would be primarily attacked by AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) that used a specialized targeting system that follows radar signals. This attack rapidly whittled down Iraqi SAM sites and early warning radar, destroying them, or forcing them to be voluntarily shut off to avoid an attack (Team Mighty, 2022). The joint fire attacks served a dual purpose: to keep allied aircrafts safe against counter threats and to
destroy Iraq’s air defenses (Coda, 2023c).
Defended by the generated suppression and by vital indications and warnings reporting of SCUD missiles, these Missile attacks created a twenty-mile gap in the enemy's air defense network, “opening a corridor through which the U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighters supported by EF-111 Ravens, [could race] into Iraqi air-space virtually unopposed” (Bird, 2004;
U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.). Radars were engaged electronically by U.S. Air Force EF-111A Raven Electronic Warfare aircraft while U.S. Air Force EC-130H Compass Call planes attacked radio communications. Furthermore, US Navy and Marine Corps aircrafts like the AGM-88 and EA-6B Prowlers electronically and kinetically targeted hostile radars and
gathered ELINT (Withington, 2022).
These synchronized attacks left a substantial portion of Iraq’s airspace without radar coverage, preventing Iraq’s IADs from detecting waves of incoming stealth aircraft, like the F-117A Nighthawk, that then assaulted strategic ground targets in Baghdad. Supporting strategic and operational air defense infrastructure that supported command and control systems were
slowly shut down by U.S. forces (Withington, 2022; Coda, 2023b).
Conclusion
Due to attrition caused by the destruction of Hussein’s IAD and GHAD systems, stealthy and non-stealth aircraft were able to enter Iraqi airspace to reach their strategic targets. Jammed communications left the adversary confused and vulnerable on a tactical and operational level, unable to receive orders from their superiors who they heavily relied on due to Iraq’s hierarchical military training model.
With a clear and detailed Electronic Order of Battle, the United States was able to simplify their strategy into three points, focusing on the simultaneous engagement of each focus: the suppression of air defense through jamming, anti-radiation missiles, decoys, and precision-guided weapons delivered by aircraft and platforms; the jamming of Saddam Hussein’s
command, control, and communications network with EC-130 Compass Call aircraft until key nodes could be destroyed by airstrike; and the use of onboard defense electronic counter measures by shutting down any SAMs which could take down U.S. aircraft despite the other two measures (Kopp, 1993). With the success of all three focuses, Iraqi air defenders lost their situational awareness and the hierarchical command and control structure crumbled. Once invaded and without the capability to regain air superiority, Saddam Hussein's forces fell in just 100 hours.
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