Executive Summary
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the subsequent increase in Western sanctions on Russian individuals and firms, Russia’s economy has become increasingly skewed toward the defense sector. This has very likely led Russian political elites to increasingly draw patronage flows from defense-related expenditures. The wide range of sanctions has likely made it difficult for elites to diversify the sources of their graft, leaving them increasingly dependent on defense contracts for illicit funds.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin uses the distribution and withdrawal of patronage flows as a key way to maintain elite loyalty, a steady stream of defense expenditures has likely become an increasingly important cornerstone for Putin’s ability to maintain domestic political stability. Since maintaining domestic political stability is critical to Putin’s political survival, he very likely sees maintaining current defense expenditures as not only a foreign policy priority, but also a domestic political imperative. A decrease in defense expenditures would likely result in a decline in patronage flows to elites, thereby raising the prospect of elite discontent and greater difficulty in maintaining political stability.
Insikt Group therefore assesses that Putin is likely incentivized to engage in conflict abroad, not only for geopolitical purposes, but also to maintain high levels of defense spending. Should the war in Ukraine end without sanctions abatement –– and thus without providing a pathway for economic and patronage flow diversification –– Putin would likely seek alternative venues for mobilization to ensure defense-related patronage flows continue. Likely target states include non-NATO states close to Russia, including Moldova.
Public- and private-sector entities based in Europe and those with investment in Russia or users there are therefore likely to face a high-risk, unpredictable Russia-nexus cyber, physical, and economic threat environment, as long as sanctions preclude diversification of patronage flows beyond the defense sector.
As such, political settlement in Ukraine, coupled with sanctions rollbacks and security guarantees for Ukraine and other non-NATO states close to Russia, such as Moldova, likely would raise the cost of starting a conflict elsewhere while providing Putin with a pathway to diversify his elites’ patronage flows, thereby reducing his incentive to fund Russia’s patronage networks via mobilization.
Key Findings
- Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy has become increasingly dependent on military spending, with defense expenditures reaching an estimated 7.2% of GDP and 32% of the federal budget by 2025.
- The military-industrial complex now employs approximately 3.5 million Russians, accounting for roughly 5% of the total labor force, while the production of civilian goods, such as cars and home appliances, has stagnated or declined.
- Systematic Western sanctions have limited the avenues Russian elites have to accumulate illicit wealth, forcing Russian political and business elites to rely increasingly on defense contracts for patronage and graft.
- As a decrease in defense spending would likely reduce the patronage flows necessary to maintain elite loyalty and domestic stability, Putin is likely incentivized to maintain high levels of military mobilization, even if the war in Ukraine were to end.
- Putin’s likely domestic political motivation to maintain military mobilization –– whether in Ukraine or elsewhere –– means that dissuading Putin from pursuing further interventions abroad likely would require not only negotiating a peace in Ukraine and providing security guarantees for Kyiv, but also alleviating sanctions on Russia, thereby providing Putin a pathway to diversify the sources of elite patronage
Source: RecordedFuture
Source Link: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/russia-defense-base-economy-risks-wars